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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the 
annual Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research 
projects funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School 
of Business and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote 
speakers, plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show 
and social events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid 
environment where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry 
officials, accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate 
on finding applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and 
processes within the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of 
industry and academia, the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and 
collaborations which can identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, 
contract, financial, logistics and program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, 
electronic copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, 
please visit our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
Symposium during the third week of May, please visit our conference website at: 
www.researchsymposium.org  
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Federal Government agencies convert in-house positions to contractor positions via 
the A-76 process in order to save money.  During an A-76 conversion, stable future labor 
cost growth is assumed.  This assumption is faulty in cases wherein the contractor 
workforce subsequently unionizes.  Unionization may lead to unanticipated increases in 
cost, threatening the savings projected during the A-76 process.  This study seeks to: 1) 
compare the rate of labor-cost growth for military, civilian, and contract employees and 2) 
compare current labor costs for a sample outsourced activity (fuels) to labor costs for the 
military requirement based on manpower standards.  The study finds that overall, annual 
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) wages increases were typically 1-2% higher than 
Service Contract Act (SCA) wages increases.  However, we found no evidence that 
contractors performed functions in our sample functional area at a higher cost than in-
house.  The actual cost of contractors averaged ~40% less than the cost derived from the 
military manpower standard.  The actual in-house cost averaged over 20% higher than the 
cost derived from the manpower standard.  Our results indicate that for the fuels functional 
area, A-76 actions remain economically advantageous to the government, despite increases 
in contract labor cost. 
Introduction 
In 1966, the US Government began using the A-76 process to evaluate 
governmental activities as candidates for outsourcing (OMB, 1983, August 4).   The A-76 
process provides a roadmap for government to convert work from internal (military in our 
study) performance to either contractor support or a redefined in-house performance 
organization.  The intent of the A-76 process is to save money while freeing military 
personnel to perform inherently governmental functions.  The A-76 process requires the use 
of estimates of future cost growth when evaluating cost not just in the current year, but in the 
out-years as well.  These estimates are based on assumptions of stable future cost growth.   
Several potential frustrations may develop for commanders in the post-A76 
environment.  These frustrations include a perceived loss of flexibility in mission support 
when moving from military to contractor support.  Further, there may be frustration with 
“must pay” contract cost increases stemming from an increase in union-negotiated collective 
bargaining agreements (CBAs) and the perception that contractors have no incentive to 
control CBA cost growth because the increase is passed on to the government agency as a 
100% pass-through.   
The impact of increasing labor costs for service contracts is felt Air Force-wide.  
Activities are competitively sourced for various reasons, but cost savings are a primary 
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driver.  When the cost of the contracted services expands beyond expectations, then only 
two options exist for the government: reduce the level of service or take funding away from 
other requirements.  Both of these actions have a negative impact on day-to-day operations. 
Loss of flexibility coupled with ever-increasing contract cost has caused some 
commanders to ask whether or not the A-76 evaluation process adequately considers future 
labor cost growth in the decision to outsource. 
 Wage Rate History 
Wage rates in contracted-out functions are controlled by the Service Contract Act 
(SCA).  The SCA’s purpose is to protect the wages and benefits of service contract 
employees.  41USC351 provides required provisions for public contracts in excess of 
$2500.  The Secretary of Labor creates wage determinations to establish minimum wages 
for various categories of workers in a location.  41USC351(a) requires the contractor to 
provide wages and fringe benefits at least equal to the amounts established in the 
Department of Labor wage determination. 
The Fair Labor Standards Act and Service Contract Act, “Price Adjustment (Multiple 
Year and Option Contracts)” clause incorporates this law into government contracts (FAR, 
2007, 52.222-43).  It applies to both contracts covered under the SCA as well as those 
under which the workforce is unionized, and it operates under a CBA.  The contractor’s 
employees are protected by these Acts as their pay and fringe benefits cannot fall below the 
wage determination of the Department of Labor.  The contractor is protected by these acts 
because the increases in pay and fringe benefits are pass-through costs to the government.  
Thus, the contractor is not subject to financial ruin due to increasing labor/fringe benefit 
rates.  The government takes on the financial burden of these increases to, in effect, protect 
the contractor’s employees (Lear Siegler Services).  This creates a financial obligation to the 
contracting entity which that entity has little input or control over.  In SCA actions, the 
increases reflect the rise in wages in the local area per the wage determination, and are, 
therefore, seen as somewhat predictable.  CBA negotiations between the contractor and the 
employees’ union are not bound to such limitations, and are seen as less predictable. 
Two additional Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) citations are very relevant.  
FAR 22.1008-2 (b) mandates that wage determinations and CBAs carry over even if there is 
a change in contractor due to the contract being reawarded.  The intent here is clear: 
because the competing bidders are bound to the same labor rates as the incumbent, they 
cannot develop a bid advantage solely by discounting employees’ wages.  The effect of this, 
however, may be to reduce the incentive of the incumbent to drive a hard bargain in 
negotiations with the union.  For one, they do not actually pay the increases, and secondly, 
their competition gains no advantage from the negotiated increases. 
Finally, FAR 22.1002-3 and FAR 22.1021 do provide avenues for the government to 
ensure that the negotiations between the contractor and union are legitimate.  FAR 22.1021 
allows the contracting officer to request a hearing with the Department of Labor (DoL) to 
determine if the negotiated CBA rates are reasonable.  The CBA will not be applied if: 
  
The Secretary of Labor determines—(1) after a hearing, that the wage and 
fringe benefits are substantially at variance with those which prevail for 
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services of a similar character in the locality, or (2) that the wages and fringe 
benefits are not the result of arm’s length negotiations. (FAR, 2007, 22.1002-
3 (a) (1) (2)) 
The question of how much the wage and fringe benefit rates of collective bargaining 
agreements vary from the SCA rates raised by this FAR reference is at the heart of this 
research. 
Three previous studies have addressed labor-cost growth issues and were 
referenced in this study.  The first was conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses in 2001, 
entitled, “Long-run Costs and Performance Effects of Competitive Sourcing” (Rosenblum, 
Coast & Smallwood, 2001).  The second study entitled, “Personnel Savings in Competitively 
Sourced DoD Activities: Are they Real?  Will They Last?” was conducted by RAND in 2000 
(Gates & Robbert).  The third study referenced was conducted by Dr. Roger Golden and 
published in his dissertation entitled, “Cost Trends on Defense Commissary Service 
Contracts” (1999). 
When the government converts work to contractor performance through the A-76 
process, stable future labor cost growth is assumed.  This assumption is faulty in cases 
wherein the contractor workforce unionizes.  In addition, the assumption may lead to 
unanticipated increases in cost, which could invalidate savings projected during the A-76 
process.  Establishing a better method to compare future labor cost will ensure the more 
cost-effective organization, over the long term, performs the service. 
The ultimate aim of this research stream is to develop an additional cost growth 
factor to consider in the A-76 process.  This study focuses on answering two fundamental 
questions necessary to develop such a factor: Do CBAs lead to faster wage growth?  Do 
CBAs end up costing the government more than military performance of the function? 
Objectives 
1. Compare cost growth in labor rates of military, civilian, Service Contract Act, and 
collective bargaining agreement employees. 
2. Compare current labor costs for an A-76-affected activity to labor costs for the 
military requirement based on manpower standards. 
 The Sample: Air Education and Training Command (AETC)  
The Air Force Air Education and Training Command (AETC) administers many 
contracts with industry for commercial functions.  AETC has conducted A-76 competitive 
sourcing studies over a long period of time, with many being completed in the 1980’s and 
1990’s.   
The current challenge to AETC is that the government is required to pay the 
contractor for wage increases, whether they originate from a revised wage determination 
under the Service Contract Act (SCA) or a renegotiation of a collective bargaining 
agreement (CBA).  While the SCA is considered a fairly stable and predictable cost growth, 
the CBA growth is viewed as less predictable.  For an organization with a defined budget, 
being required to fund unpredictable labor cost requirements can have negative impacts. 
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AETC’s mission has led to frequent use of the A-76 process to competitively source 
commercial activities.  Based on these factors, the study team selected AETC bases as the 
sample for this study. 
Methodology 
 Assumptions 
1. Direct comparison of base pay rates between military, civilian, SCA, and CBA 
employees is acceptable as a method of comparing labor cost growth.  Because the 
composite factors for military pay contain costs not obtainable for civilian, SCA and 
CBA rates, the base pay rate is the most accurate measure for comparison between 
the contracted and in-house pay growth. 
2. Time is not a factor in calculating labor cost growth rates as the comparison between 
rates covers the same time periods and, therefore, the time/inflation costs are the 
same. 
3. SCA base pay rates plus health and welfare (H&W) costs are directly comparable to 
CBA base pay rates plus H&W costs.  This assumption is necessary to allow for 
direct comparison of the two rates, although they may not always mean exactly the 
same thing for each CBA. 
4. Overhead costs for Civilian, SCA and CBA positions are assumed to be relatively 
consistent, allowing comparison of wage increases without incorporating applicable 
overhead costs.  This assumption is needed to conduct timely analysis. 
5. The manpower standard for Fuels can be used as an independent comparison factor 
for the fuels function.  The standard is not being used as a manpower adjustment 
tool as it is designed.   
 Objective 1: Cost Growth of Labor Rates 
The first objective is to compare the labor cost growth in the various types of pay 
structures: military, civilian, contractor under SCA, and contractor under CBA.  The purpose 
of this comparison was to determine if CBA wages increased at a higher rate than SCA 
wages and to compare that wage growth to military and civilian wage growth.  The 
development of this comparison involved several steps. 
The analysis was conducted by location because the pay scales and wage increases 
for SCA, and CBA employees varied by location.  The first step was to identify AETC bases 
that had multiple CBAs.  This is important because while the other three pay types are 
widespread, there are a limited number of CBAs.  Some installations had just one CBA.  
Requiring a location to have multiple CBAs in order to be included is a precaution to prevent 
one aberrant CBA from skewing the location’s comparison.  After that, the pay increases 
were calculated for each position and compared.  The wages were also combined to 
analyze the wage growth for each type of pay over all of AETC. 
The analysis of wage increases was conducted on base-pay rates and composite-
pay rates.  For base-pay rates, there are no fringe benefits (e.g., health and welfare costs) 
or overhead (e.g., FICA, SUDA, FUDA, etc.) costs included in the wages.  For military 
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wages, the base-pay rates did not include BAH, BAS, or any other fringe costs.  For 
composite-pay rates, fringe benefits are included for all pay types, but the overhead costs 
are only included in the military pay rates.  The overhead costs would be the same for SCA 
and CBA-determined wages because the contractor employing each position would not 
change.   
 Objective 2: Contractor vs. Military Cost Growth 
The second objective was to compare actual contractor costs and actual 
military/civilian costs for a specific function to the manpower standard cost for that function.  
Although manpower standards are not recommended for A-76 competitions or reverse A-76 
actions, this study used the manpower standard to contrast how in-house and contractor 
functions related to the standard.  The manpower standard was used because manpower 
data was usually unavailable, outside of a limited timeframe, after the completion of an A-76 
competition.  The end result of this objective is a comparison of the actual costs of the 
function performed by military, civilian, and CBA employees to a calculated cost using the 
manpower standard. 
The first step was to identify a function that, within AETC, is performed in-house at 
some locations while contracted out at others under collective bargaining agreements.  The 
function had to have a relatively stable workload that could be easily quantified.  The fuels 
function at AETC bases met these requirements, and as such was selected as a 
representative function for this study. 
The next step was to calculate the manpower standards based on the Fuels 
Management Manpower Standard outlined in AFMS 41DA.  The resulting manpower 
standards for each base were then converted to positions as described in AFMS 41DA.  
These positions were next converted to total cost.  After that, the actual costs of the fuel 
functions at each base were compared with their respective manpower standard costs.  For 
in-house costs, the assigned personnel numbers obtained from the AFPC Authorized and 
Assigned database were matched to position-costs to compute the actual costs of the in-
house organization.  For contracted-out costs, the actual contract costs were used. 
Finally, the cost ratios of actual cost to projected costs using the manpower standard 
were calculated.  These results were presented numerically and graphically.   
Analysis 
 Objective 1: Cost Growth of Labor Rates 
Of the AETC bases, seven bases provided data on three or more collective 
bargaining agreements: Columbus, Keesler, Lackland, Laughlin, Randolph, Sheppard, and 
Tyndall.  Personnel at these locations provided the actual wage tables from the CBAs.  
Military base-pay and composite-pay tables were obtained through the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) website (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 
2007).  The civilian pay was comprised of Non-appropriated Funds (NAF) pay tables, 
Appropriated Funds (AF) pay tables and General Schedule (GS) pay tables.  These civilian 
base-pay tables were obtained from the Department of Defense (DoD) Civilian Personnel 
Management Service Website, and the fringe rates were obtained from the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) transmittal M-07-02 (Civilian Personnel Management, 
2007). The SCA pay tables and fringe rates were obtained from the DoL– SCA Wage 
Determinations website (Wage, 2007).  
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Next, all the base and composite pay tables were aggregated by year and the pay 
increases for individual positions or grades were calculated.  The mean increase for each 
position or grade was computed to form an overall rate of increase for each year.  This 
process was repeated for the civilian, SCA and CBA pay at the seven different bases and 
the results were tabulated and graphed.1  
Analysis of the four pay types occurred in three phases.  First, the average pay 
increases, by position, for each pay type were analyzed by year.  This analysis was not 
conclusive because pay types such as SCA didn’t get pay raises every year.  Often, the 
SCA pay increases occurred every two years in large increments.  Thus, the graphs 
resulting from this phase of analysis were not static and did not reveal any significant trends.   
The next phase of the analysis was to calculate the cumulative wage increases for 
each pay type.  This was done by compounding each pay increase by that of previous years 
to reveal the overall growth over time for each position.  A challenge was encountered in this 
phase of the analysis: not all bases had CBA wage history from FY99 to FY06.  Thus, the 
cumulative wages for these bases did not start until the CBA history began, which created a 
lag in the graphs. 
The final phase of the analysis was to adjust the CBA wage increases for years 
without CBA wage history.   To better represent the CBA wage increases, the CBAs were 
assumed to follow SCA wage increases for the years that the CBAs were not in effect.  This 
was a safe assumption because contracted employees would have followed SCA wage 
rates before unionization.  Also, Tyndall AFB did not have any SCA or CBA wage history 
available for FY00 or FY01.  To account for this, SCA and CBA wage increases were each 
conservatively assumed to be 3.0% for both years. 
The results for all seven bases were combined and are shown in Figures 1 and 2.  
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) line on each graph represents the DoL-reported wage 




















Figure 1. AETC Base-pay Increases by Year 
 
                                                
1 Individual results for each base are available from the authors. 
  


















Figure 2. AETC Composite-pay Increases by Year 
 
The next step was to look at the cumulative pay increases over time.  To do this, the 
rate of increase for every year is compounded by the rates of increase for the previous 
years.  This step assists in showing the total increase over time for each category of 
employee.  The results of this analysis are shown in Figures 3 and 4.2   
 
 


















Figure 3. AETC Cumulative Base-pay Increases 
 
                                                
2 Individual results for each base are available from the authors. 
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Figure 4. AETC Cumulative Composite-pay Increases 
 
One challenge existed in this cumulative-pay analysis; some bases did not have any 
CBAs for FY00, FY01 or FY02.  To better represent the CBA wage increases, the CBAs are 
assumed to follow SCA wage increases for the years that the CBAs were not in effect.  This 
is a safe assumption because contracted employees would have followed SCA wage rates 
before unionization.  Also, as mentioned previously, Tyndall AFB did not have any SCA or 
CBA wage history available for FY00 or FY01.  To account for this, SCA and CBA wage 
increases are each conservatively assumed to be 3.0% (lower than the BLS) for both years.  
The results of these adjustments are shown in Figures 5 and 6.   
 
  


















Figure 5.  AETC Cumulative Base-pay Increases (CBA Adjusted) 
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Figure 6. AETC Cumulative Composite-pay Increases (CBA Adjusted) 
 
Figures 5 and 6 show that CBAs have increased at a slightly higher rate than the 
SCA wages, and the military pay rates have increased at a higher rate than any of the other 









Military 38.98% 50.03% 
CBA 34.99% 38.87% 
Civilian 28.21% 31.65% 
SCA 22.63% 32.35% 
BLS 24.60% 24.60% 
Table 1.  AETC Cumulative Pay Increases from FY99 to FY06 
 
Objective 2: Contractor vs. Military Cost Growth 
Seven AETC bases have contracted out for their fuels support (Columbus, Laughlin, 
Maxwell, Randolph, Sheppard, Tyndall, and Vance).  All of these workforces operate under 
collective bargaining agreements.  However, two of these bases (Maxwell and Tyndall) 
operate under BOS (Base Operations Support) contracts that combine many functional 
areas under one contract line-item.  This made the fuels costs at these two bases difficult to 
clearly identify. As a result, Maxwell and Tyndall AFBs were eliminated from the study.  Six 
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AETC bases perform the function in-house with military and/or civilian personnel (Altus, 
Goodfellow, Keesler, Lackland, Little Rock, and Luke).   
The manpower standard for the fuel function is not an accurate predictor of the 
number of personnel required for smaller workloads because it starts with ~27 positions as a 
baseline regardless of the workload.  Thus, because Goodfellow AFB handles considerably 
less fuel than the other AETC bases (which skews the data), it was excluded from the 
analysis.3  The remaining pool for analysis consisted of five in-house bases and five 
collective bargaining agreement bases.  With the assistance of the Manpower flight at 
Maxwell AFB and the fuels functional chief at AETC, the standard manpower costs for each 
of these ten organizations were calculated using the composite-pay figures for military and 
civilian personnel.  The results are in Figure 7. 
Figure 7 indicates that the Fuels function is varied at the eight bases examined.  
From Altus, with an annual calculated manpower standard cost of nearly $5 million dollars, 
to Keesler, with an annual calculated manpower standard cost of just over $2 million, the 




















































Figure 7. Manpower Standard Cost 
 
The fuels function at ten AETC bases was analyzed by comparing actual FY06 costs 
to their respective manpower standard-derived costs.  Five of the bases analyzed had 
contracted fuel organizations, and the other five had in-house fuel organizations.  In the first 
step, manpower standards were calculated using the Fuels Management Manpower 
Standard outlined in AFMS 41DA.  The resulting manpower standards were then converted 
                                                
3 At Goodfellow, all fuels functions are performed by one person, a GS-7. 
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to positions as described in AFMS 41DA, and the positions were next converted to total 
cost.   
Next, the actual cost of each organization was compared to the calculated manpower 
standard cost.  For contracted organizations, the actual FY06 contract costs were used in 
the comparison.  For in-house organizations, the assigned personnel numbers obtained 
from the AFPC Authorized and Assigned database were used to compute the total 
personnel costs. 
Finally, the cost ratios of actual cost and manpower standard-calculated costs were 
calculated, revealing that contractor costs remain economically advantageous to the Air 
Force.   
The next step in the calculation was to calculate the actual cost of manpower at 
those locations that are manned by in-house personnel.  With assistance from AETC fuels 
personnel and the Air Force Personnel Center’s Assigned/Authorized data source, the 
actual cost for labor for FY06 was calculated for each of the five bases.  Again, the 















Figure 8. Manpower Standard Costs vs. In-house Costs at In-house Organizations 
 
A similar comparison was then made between the contracted organizations and their 
calculated manpower standard costs.  This comparison is shown in Figure 9.  Table 2 then 
compares the percentage of the calculated manpower standard cost to the actual 
organization cost.  This comparison uses the assigned-personnel cost for in-house 
organizations, as this more accurately captures the cost to the Air Force.   
 
  















Figure 9. Manpower Standard Cost vs. Contract Cost at Contracted Organizations 
 
Base In-house Contracted Percentage 
Altus X  97.8% 
Columbus  X 66.2% 
Keesler X  69.2% 
Lackland X  127.2% 
Laughlin  X 46.1% 
Little Rock X  147.5% 
Luke X  162.2% 
Randolph  X 59.4% 
Sheppard  X 54.6% 
Vance  X 76.6% 
Table 2. Percent of Actual Cost vs. Manpower Standard Cost 
 
The in-house bases averaged 123.0% of the hypothetical manpower standard cost.  
As seen in Table 2, Keesler AFB is the only in-house organization to perform the function at 
a considerably lower cost than dictated by the manpower standard.  This is possibly a result 
of the inherent flaw in the manpower standard for organizations with smaller workloads.  The 
contracted organizations averaged 60.7% of the hypothetical manpower standard cost.  
Thus, using the manpower standard cost simply to contrast how in-house and contractor 
actual costs compared to the standard, contractor costs are still economically advantageous 
overall for the sampled fuel functions.   
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Findings 
 Objective 1: Cost Growth of Labor Rates 
There was an observed trend of CBA wages growing at a faster rate than SCA 
wages.  Typically, annual CBA base-pay increases were 1.76% higher than the SCA base-
pay increases.  The analysis showed that the annual composite-pay increases were ~1% 
higher in CBA positions than in SCA positions.  This trend is probably more significant than 
shown considering the initial jump in wages that often occurs when SCA positions unionize.  
When positions unionize, the CBA usually negotiates a one-time spike in wages before 
leveling off.  This SCA-to-CBA wage jump was not captured by our analysis because the 
conversion usually involved a position-name change, preventing direct comparison. The 
military and CBA wage increases appeared to be the fastest growing of the four pay-types 
investigated at the seven bases.   
Objective 2: Contractor vs. Military Cost Growth 
There was a trend that contractors performed fuel functions at a lower cost than in-
house in comparison to their calculated manpower standard costs.  For contracted services, 
the actual cost of contractors averaged ~40% less than the cost derived from the manpower 
standard.  For in-house services, the actual in-house cost averaged over 20% higher than 
the cost derived from the manpower standard.  Thus, in these cases, the A-76 actions still 
appear to be economically advantageous to the government.  
 
Limitations 
1. Manpower data is difficult to obtain outside of a limited timeframe.  This limits the ability 
to develop an in-house organization comparable to a contracted organization without 
significant investment of time and expertise. 
2. Contract data is limited in its timeframe.  Contracting files are maintained in accordance 
with the Federal Acquisition Regulation.  The timeframe of the study is limited to the 
years that the data is available. 
3. There is a limited sample size available for the study.  It only includes those service 
contracts within AETC that have CBAs.  The size was further constrained to those 
locations where multiple contracts exist.  This limitation and constraint restricts the 
general application of the results of the study. 
4. Changes in position names/job titles when contractor positions unionize prevent a direct 
comparison of SCA and CBA wage growth. 
5. All military and civilian pay grades were analyzed, but not all pay grades would typically 
be converted to service contract positions. 
Conclusion 
This study takes important preliminary steps toward determining whether an 
additional A-76 competitive sourcing process factor to account for future contract cost 
growth should be developed.  We found the research highly challenging due to the lack of 
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historical documentation in all areas.  The documents recording the manpower assessment 
at the heart of the A-76 process is almost never available.  The assumptions used by 
evaluators relative to future labor cost growth at the time of the A-76 decision are difficult to 
acquire, if not impossible. As such, it is difficult if not impossible (perhaps by design) to 
conduct an assessment of how closely the assumptions at the time of the A-76 track the 
actual post-decision labor increases.  As such, it would be difficult to develop a factor to 
adjust the assumptions used by evaluators if we cannot determine what the initial 
assumptions were. 
A common perception in the DoD is that CBA cost growth in the out-years makes 
outsourcing less attractive financially.  This study finds that while CBA cost growth is 
substantial, in our sample functional area, CBA cost growth lagged behind the cost growth 
of military labor.  One explanation may be that while commanders are forced to deal with the 
realities of increasing contract costs at the MAJCOM and local level, they may be less aware 
of the challenges of dealing with the even more substantial increases in military personnel 
costs, which are often dealt with at the Air Staff level. 
A final finding of note is that government service civilian cost growth lagged behind 
both military and contract labor growth, indicating that over time, civilian labor may prove to 
be the most stable of the three labor types considered.  Our findings do indicate that future 
cost growth is not stable; however, it appears to be instable in both military and contractor 
labor pools.  As such, should a factor be pursued to provide better insight into the future cost 
of contractor labor, one should also be pursued to provide better insight into military labor 
cost. 
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